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Abstract
The aim of this paper is that of studying a notion of independence for imprecise
probabilities which is essentially based on the intuitive meaning of this concept. This is
expressed, in the case of two events, by the reciprocal irrelevance of the knowledge of
the value of each event for evaluating the other one, and has been termed epistemic
independence. In order to consider more general situations in the framework of co-
herent imprecise probabilities, a definition of (epistemic) independence is introduced
referring to arbitrary sets of logically independent partitions. Logical independence is
viewed as a natural prerequisite for epistemic independence. It is then proved that the
definition is always consistent, its relationship with the factorization rule is analysed,
and some of its more relevant implications are discussed. Ó 2000 Elsevier Science Inc.
All rights reserved.
Keywords: Coherent imprecise probabilities; (epistemic) Independence; Logical inde-
pendence; Factorization
1. Introduction
Let A, B be two non-impossible events and m a measure of uncertainty on
fA;Bg. Then it is quite intuitive to call B irrelevant to A (with respect to the
given m) if the knowledge of the logical value of B (either that B is true or that
B is false) does not alter our evaluation on the uncertainty of A, which remains
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still equal to mA. A natural way of introducing independence between A and
B (under m) is then that of identifying it with the mutual irrelevance of A to B
and of B to A. When m is a coherent imprecise probability, this is the notion of
epistemic independence for two events given by Walley [11], where the concept is
also generalised to two partitions or two independent experiments.
The main purpose of this paper is to extend the concept of epistemic inde-
pendence, using the Definition 2.2 of coherence due to Williams, to an arbi-
trary family of (finite or infinite) logically independent partitions of the certain
event X (Definition 3.1), to prove its consistency, i.e. to show that there always
exist (coherent) imprecise probabilities that satisfy the conditions required by
this definition (Section 3.2, Theorem 3), and to discuss some of its implications
in Sections 3.5, 4 and 5.
Operationally, the usual approach to (unconditional or conditional) inde-
pendence under a given uncertainty measure aims at establishing some alge-
braic condition, like the factorization property, which greatly simplifies the
computations and the underlying models in most applications, from sampling
to Bayesian networks.
However this approach and that based on irrelevance do not perfectly
overlap. This does not even happen in the simplest case when m is a precise
probability measure P: for instance, identifying independence of A, B with the
property PA ^ B  PAP B would imply that A is independent from itself if
P A  1, A and B are at any rate independent if P A  0 or P B  0 (other
interesting examples may be found in [1; 2; 4, p. 274; 11]). Things may become
more complicated with other uncertainty measures (see, for instance, [3,5]). In
particular, several concepts of independence have been proposed for imprecise
probabilities, among them the sensitivity analysis approach (we postpone a
comment on it to Section 3.3) and those in [3].
In our framework, (epistemic) independence necessarily implies, but is not
equivalent to, a ‘weak’ factorization property (Section 3.4, Proposition 1);
anyway ‘strong’ factorization can always be imposed, has a special probabi-
listic meaning and may be a reasonable choice on many occasions, as shown in
Section 3.5.
Another question concerns the implications of the proposed independence
condition when extending the imprecise probability to larger sets of events, in
particular in terms of independence propagation. Although a full under-
standing of the matter requires further investigation, some special interesting
cases are discussed in Sections 4.1 and 4.2.
2. Preliminaries
We recall in this section the basic definitions and well-known results which
will be used in the sequel.
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2.1. Notation
If A is an event, Ac is its negation, IA is the indicator function of A (i.e.
IA  1 if A is true, IA  0 if A is false).
A0 indicates an event which may be either A or Ac; any expression including
A0 (for instance (i) and (ii) at the beginning of Section 3) is meant to hold when
replacing A0 with A or Ac.
X is the certain event, and / is the impossible one. Following the logical
interpretation of events, we write ^, _,) to denote the logical product, logical
sum and implication of events (corresponding, respectively, to \, [, and 2 or 
in the set-theoretic approach).
2.2. Partitions and logical independence
A partition P of the certain event X is an exhaustive set of pairwise disjoint
events, called constituents, which might in general include also /. The non-
impossible constituents of P are called atoms. Defining P/  Pÿ f/g, par-
tition P/ is made up of atoms only. None of the partitions to be considered in
the sequel will be the null partition P0  fXg.
Denote with AP the algebra of the events logically dependent on P, i.e. the
set formed by the events which are logical sums of constituents of P (AP is
the power set of P in set-theory language); define also A/P AP ÿ f/g.
Given an arbitrary set of partitions S, the product partition ^S of the par-
titions of S is the partition whose constituents are the logical products obtained
choosing as operands a constituent for every partition of S in all possible ways.
Putting S/  fP/ : P 2 Sg, ^S/ is the product partition of the partitions of S,
all leaving out /. For instance, if S  fP1; . . . ;Png, Pi  fAi;Aci g, Ai 6 /,
Ai 6 X, i  1; . . . ; n, any constituent of ^S/  ^Pi ( ^P/i , in this case) may
be written in the form A01 ^    ^ A0n. Some constituents of ^S/ may in general
be impossible.
The partitions of S are logically independent (in short, lg. i.) if the constit-
uents of ^S/ are all possible. This implies in particular that choosing arbitrarily
partitions P1; . . . ;Pn from S, it is always A1 ^    ^ An 6 /; 8Ai 2A/Pi;
i  1; . . . ; n:
Logical independence is a concept which does not require any uncertainty
evaluation, but should be a prerequisite for notions of independence involving
uncertainty measures (see Section 3.1).
2.3. Precise and imprecise coherent probabilities
We shall denote with E an arbitrary (finite or infinite) non-empty set of
conditional events. Then, following [7] we recall the next definition.
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Definition 2.1. P  j  is a coherent conditional probability on E i, 8m,








it is true that max G jB P 0.
The coherence concepts for precise and imprecise probabilities we recall here
require a conditional random number (G jB in Definition 2.1, G jB in the next
Definition 2.2) not to be strictly negative. G can be interpreted as the gain
obtained from an arbitrary finite number of bets, each on a conditional event in
E, and conditioning (G or G) on B takes account of the fact that the bet on
Ai jBi is called o i IBi  0, so that it is meaningful to evaluate the gains only
for IB  1; in fact IB  0 identifies the situation where no bet actually takes
place.
It is possible in Definition 2.1 to bet both in favour (si > 0) and against
(si < 0) any Ai jBi, whilst coherence for imprecise lower probabilities in Defi-
nition 2.2 allows betting against at most one event, for each choice of the
distinct events Ai jBi 2 E appearing in the expression of the gain G.
Definition 2.2. P  j  is a coherent lower probability on E i, 8m, 8Ai jBi 2 E,









it is true that max G jB P 0.
This is the coherence notion by Williams [13], which coincides with Walley’s
definition of coherence in [11, Section 7.1.4 (b)], if E is finite, is weaker if E is
infinite (hence not all of the results in the sequel still apply with Walley’s
definition). See also [6,10,11] for other concepts of coherence with imprecise
probabilities.
Upper probabilities P j  are customarily related to lower probabilities by
the conjugacy relation
P A jB  1ÿ P Ac jB; 1
which we assume to hold throughout; hence it is sucient to refer to, for in-
stance, lower probabilities only.
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A precise probability P  j  on E is the special case of imprecise probability
where P A jB  P A jB  P A jB for all events in E (while in general
P A jB6 PA jB.
Further, coherent lower probabilities can be characterized as lower enve-
lopes of coherent precise probabilities [13].
Theorem 1 (Lower envelope theorem). P j  is a coherent lower probability on
E iff there exists a non-empty set M of coherent conditional probabilities on E
such that
P A jB  min
P2M
fP A jBg; 8A jB 2 E: 2
The lower envelope theorem gives in particular an indirect but useful way of
assessing coherent lower probabilities as lower envelopes of precise probabil-
ities. P is called the lower envelope of M, and 8P 2 M , it is P P P , or in words P
dominates P .
2.4. Extensions of probabilities
Coherent lower or precise probabilities on E can be extended to any E0  E,
i.e. if P P  is a coherent lower (precise) probability on E, then 8E0  E there
exists P 0 (P 0) which is coherent on E0 and coincides with P (with P) on E (ex-
tension theorem [7,13]).
Generally, there is no unique way of extending P from E to E0, but there
always exists a least-committal coherent extension P  which is such that every
other coherent extension P 0 on E0 dominates it, i.e. P 0P P .
P  is the natural extension in the terminology of [11] (actually the concept of
natural extension is wider than the one recalled here, which is at any rate
sucient for the purposes of this paper).
A dierent notion – which will be also employed in the sequel – is that of
common extension of imprecise (in particular, also precise) probabilities.
Given a family fEig, i 2 I , of non-empty sets of events suppose that, for each
Ei, P i is a lower probability which is defined and coherent on Ei. A real
mapping P defined on [i2IEi is the common extension of the lower proba-
bilities P i if P coincides with P i on Ei, for every i 2 I . It is of course necessary
for the existence of the common extension that any event belonging to more
than one Ei is given the same evaluation by the corresponding probabilities
P i. For example, consider two partitions P1 and P2, a lower probability P 1
coherent on E1 AP1, and P 2 coherent on E2 AP2. If P1 and P2 are
logically independent, then E1 \ E2  f/;Xg and hence there exists on
E1 [ E2 the common extension P of P 1, P 2, defined by P  P 1 on E1, P  P 2
on E2.
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Unlike the natural extension, the common extension is generally not co-
herent: separate coherence of every P i (each on its domain Ei) does not imply
coherence of their common extension on [Ei. There are anyway some excep-
tions, among these the one considered in Section 3.2, Lemma 1, which is rel-
evant for subsequent results.
Coherent imprecise probabilities are quite a general tool in uncertainty
reasoning, and include several common approaches to uncertainty as special
cases (see [11,12] for a wide discussion). Note further that the set E is com-
pletely arbitrary, which ensures a great flexibility too.
It is also important to recall that if fA jB;Bg  E, the assignment PB  0 is
not in general ruled out a priori, i.e. it may be possible to condition on events
whose lower probability is zero. This fact should not be particularly unusual in
practice: for instance, recall that under a sensitivity analysis interpretation the
assessment P B  0; P B  a > 0 means that the assessor’s feeling about the
‘correct’ probability of B is just that it cannot be more than a, but his infor-
mation is lower vacuous (entirely vacuous if also a  1).
3. Independent partitions
Two events A, B (A;B 6 /;A;B 6 X are called in [11] (epistemically) inde-
pendent
(i) if P A jB0  P A; P A jB0  PA (irrelevance of B to A) and
P B jA0  P B; PB jA0  PB (irrelevance of A to B); or also
(ii) if P A0 jB0  P A0; P B0 jA0  P B0:
Conditions (i) and (ii) are equivalent, assuming that (1) holds.
We can generalise this definition to an arbitrary number of partitions, each
with an arbitrary cardinality, in the following way.
Definition 3.1. Let S be a set of lg. i. partitions and define the set of events
C  fE1 jE2 ^    ^ En : E1 2AP1;Ei 2A/Pi;Pi 6 P1;
i  2; . . . ; n; fP1; . . . ;Png  Sg; 3
where it is understood that every partition P 2 S and every finite number nÿ 1
of partitions in S ÿ fPg are in turn indexed as, respectively,P1 andP2; . . . ;Pn.
Let P be a lower probability on C.
The partitions of S are epistemically independent with respect to P , or simply
independent, i
P E1 jE2 ^    ^ En  P E1; 8E1 jE2 ^    ^ En 2 C: 4
In words, the definition requires that the lower probability of any event E1
logically dependent on an arbitrarily chosen partition in S is independent of the
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knowledge of the truth values of any finite logical product of events logically
dependent on partitions in S other than that of E1.
Note that for notational simplicity the partitions in S have not been given
fixed indexes in Definition 3.1 (each partition may be P1, every other partition
may be Pi; i > 1). Partition indexes will be often used essentially in this way
also in the sequel, for instance in (5).
3.1. The logical independence assumption
We obtain in particular (ii) from Definition 3.1 putting S  fPa;Pbg;
Pa  fA;Acg;Pb  fB;Bcg. Note that logical independence of Pa and Pb is
essential to apply (ii) being capable of evaluating freely A0 and B0. In fact, if for
instance one constituent of Pa ^Pb is impossible, let it be A ^ B, it is necessary
(to ensure that both the independence conditions in (ii) and the coherence
requirements P A jB  P B jA  0; P Ac jB  P Bc jA  1 may hold) to
evaluate P A  P B  0; P Ac  PBc  1, which means by (1) that both A
and B must be given precise probability zero.
More generally, the logical independence assumption in Definition 3.1 is
motivated by the fact that if it is not assumed either it may be impossible to
meet conditions (4) or very strong constraints on the values of P must be as-
sumed. See [1,2], where Definition 3.1 has been introduced referring to precise
probabilities, for a wide discussion on this point (many of the arguments there
can be easily transposed to imprecise probabilities).
Logical independence is regarded as an essential prerequisite for indepen-
dence also in [4,9].
In particular, logical independence for ‘frames of discernment’ (i.e. finite
partitions) is required by Shafer [9, pp. 127–129], for both evidential and
cognitive independence of support functions.
3.2. Consistency of epistemic independence
The first question now is to make sure that Definition 3.1 is not vacuous, i.e.
that there exists a coherent lower probability on C which realizes conditions
(4). It will be useful for this the following result, proved in [1] or [2].
Theorem 2. Let S be a set of lg. i. partitions, define C as in (3), and assign, for
every P 2 S, a coherent (precise) probability P on AP. Then the common
extension on C of the probabilities on each AP, defined for all events in C by
P E1 jE2 ^    ^ En  P E1, is a coherent precise probability. Further, P has a
unique extension on C [P, where P is defined by
P  fE1 ^    ^ En : Ei 2APi; i  1; . . . ; n; fP1; . . . ;Png  Sg; 5
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the extension is obtained by factorization, i.e. putting, for every
E1 ^    ^ En 2 P,
P E1 ^    ^ En  PE1    PEn: 6
We shall also need the following Lemma 1, whose proof can be easily
achieved exploiting Definition 2.1 or 2.2 and the logical independence as-
sumption (the part concerning precise probabilities is also implied by Theorem
2).
Note that Lemma 1 is of some interest in itself, because it concerns a case
where logical independence makes it possible to obtain an aggregate uncer-
tainty evaluation simply by grouping together separate evaluations.
Lemma 1. Let S be a set of lg. i. partitions. Assign, for every P 2 S, a lower
probability coherent on AP. Then the common extension P of the lower
probabilities given on each AP is a lower probability coherent on [P2SAP.
If, in particular, a precise probability coherent on AP is given for every
P 2 S, the common extension P of the given probabilities is a precise probability
coherent on [P2SAP.
Now we prove the following theorem.
Theorem 3 (Consistency theorem). Let S be a set of lg. i. partitions, define C as
in (3), and assign, for every P 2 S, a lower probability P coherent on AP.
Then:
(a) the mapping defined on C by putting, for each E1 jE2 ^    ^ En 2 C;
P E1 jE2 ^    ^ En  P E1, is a coherent lower probability;
(b) given P on C as in (a) and defining P as in (5), there exists a coherent
extension of P on C [P (also named P ) such that, for all events in P
P E1 ^    ^ En  PE1    PEn: 7
Proof. (a) By Lemma 1, the common extension P on [P2SAP of the given
lower probabilities is coherent on [P2SAP.
Define the set
M0  fP : P is a coherent precise probability on [P2S AP;
P P P on [P2S APg;
which is non-empty as a consequence of Theorem 1. More precisely, a generic
P 2 M0 is obtained defining for each P 2 S a probability which dominates P on
AP and naming P the common extension on [P2SAP of these probabil-
ities. By varying in all admissible ways the choice of the dominating probability
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on each AP, we get all the probabilities in M0 (each one is coherent by
Lemma 1).
Extend now every P 2 M0 on C by putting P E1 jE2 ^    ^ En  P E1 for
every E1 jE2 ^    ^ En 2 C. By Theorem 2, every such extension is a coherent
probability on C.
Call M1 the set of these extensions. By Theorem 1, the mapping P defined on
every event in C by
P  j   min
P2M1
fP  j g
is a coherent lower probability on C.
But clearly P is an extension on C of the coherent lower probability previ-
ously defined on [P2SAP C, and further, by Theorem 1 and by con-
struction
P E1 jE2 ^    ^ En  min
P2M1
fP E1 jE2 ^    ^ Eng
 min
P2M1
fP E1g  min
P2M0
fP E1g  P E1:
(b) By construction, the hypotheses of Theorem 2 hold for every P 2 M1,
which then has a unique coherent extension on C [P, given for every
E1 ^    ^ En 2 P by
P E1 ^    ^ En  PE1    PEnP P E1    P En: 8
Call M2 the set formed by the extensions on C [P of all P 2 M1. Now consider
an arbitrary E1 ^    ^ En 2 P and note that there exists P  2 M2 such that
P Ei  P Ei; i  1; . . . ; n (for every AP, choose among the probabilities
dominating P on AP one such that P Ei  P Ei (Theorem 1), note that
the common extension of these P  on [P2SAP belongs to M0, then follow the
procedure in (a) and above to extend it to M1 and M2).
Then it is
P E1 ^    ^ En  PE1    PEn:
From the arbitrariness of E1 ^    ^ En and recalling also (8) it appears that the
lower probability which satisfies (7) is the lower envelope of M2: 
3.3. Independent envelopes and independence
The sets M1;M2 defined in the proof of Theorem 3 are instances of sets
whose elements (precise probabilities) all realize independence for the parti-
tions of S in the sense of Definition 3.1, applied to precise probabilities. Such
sets may be called, following [11], independent envelopes. Their use is instru-
mental in the proof of Theorem 3 as well as, often, in building up independent
lower probabilities.
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A common way of introducing independence for imprecise probabilities,
the sensitivity analysis approach, defines an independent lower probability as
the lower envelope of a set of independent precise probabilities. Anyway we
recall that the set of all precise probabilities dominating an independent
lower probability P is usually not an independent envelope, not even in the
simplest cases [10, Lemma 9.1]. In other words, independence for a lower
probability does not imply independence for all its dominating precise
probabilities.
It is not even true that lack of independence for P implies that none of
its dominating precise probabilities realizes independence. In fact, under
quite general conditions, to achieve the dilation condition PA jB06
P A6 PA 6 P A jB0 (which, if the first or last inequality is strict, is in-
compatible with irrelevance of B to A and hence with independence of A
and B) it is necessary that an unconditional probability P exists, which
dominates P (and is dominated by P ) and is such that P A ^ B  P APB
(see [8]). But this implies, if 0 < P AP B < 1, that A and B are indepen-
dent under P.
3.4. The factorization property
The factorization condition (6) on the events of the set P is a necessary, but
not sucient, condition for independence under a precise probability [2]. The
following result holds for imprecise probabilities.
Proposition 1. Let S be a set of lg. i. partitions, and P a coherent lower prob-
ability on C [P. A necessary condition for P to realize independence of the
partitions of S by Definition 3.1 is that for every E1 ^    ^ En 2 P the following
inequality holds:
P E1 ^    ^ EnP P E1    P En weak factorization: 9
Proof. In general, the following condition is necessary for coherence of lower
probabilities (supposing they are defined on the events of interest):
P E1 ^    ^ EnP P E1P E2 jE1    P En jE1 ^    ^ Enÿ1: 10
It is easy to prove (10) for n  2 (applying Definition 2.2 to the particular gain
G where m  2;A1 jB1  E1 jX  E1;A2 jB2  E2 jE1;A0 jB0  E1 ^ E2; s1 
P E2 jE1; s2  1; s0  ÿ1) and by induction for n > 2. Then (9) follows from
(10) and (4). 
Observation 1. Under hypotheses analogous to those of Proposition 1, the
condition corresponding to (9) for upper probabilities is
P E1 ^    ^ En6 P E1    P En: 11
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3.5. Factorization and independence
Inequalities (9) in Proposition 1 impose only a weak factorization condition
as necessary for epistemic independence of a set of partitions. Anyway, by
Theorem 3 (b), it is always possible to apply strict factorization – replacing P
with  in (9) – to extend on C [P a lower probability which satisfies the
independence conditions (4) in Definition 3.1, therefore reaching the lower
bound in (9) for lower probability assignments on every event in P. This im-
plies that:
(a) Strict factorization has an important probabilistic meaning: the extension
of P from C to C [P by strict factorization is the natural extension of P on
C [P, that is, applying (9) we extend a lower probability which satisfies (4)
in the vaguest, or least-committal, possible way (while preserving coher-
ence, see Section 2.4).
(b) Strict factorization is computationally simple to apply, and we know a pri-
ori that what we obtain is still a coherent probability; alternative choices
for the probability evaluations on the events in P would generally require
checking coherence of the extension so obtained, which might be heavy to
perform.
(c) Although points (a) and (b) are strong arguments in favour of strict factor-
ization, other independence-preserving extensions of P to C [P are possi-
ble. Probably the simplest way to build them is to apply Theorem 2 for
extending to C [P some, but not all, probabilities in the independent enve-
lope of P on [P2SAP , and to compute then their lower envelope on C [P.
(d) We present a simple example on point (c) (similar examples may be found
in [11]): suppose S  fPa;Pbg, Pa  fA;Acg;Pb  fB;Bcg, A0 ^ B0 6 /.
The assessments P1A  0:7; P1B  0:2, P2A  0:4; P2B  0:5 unique-
ly identify two coherent precise probabilities P1; P2 on APa [APb
 f/;X;A0;B0g. Extend them on C  f/;X;A0;B0; A0 jB0;B0 jA0g putting
PiA0 jB0  PiA0, PiB0 jA0  PiB0, and then on C [P P  fA0 ^ B0g)
by putting PiA0 ^ B0  PiA0PiB0; i  1; 2. By Theorem 2, the exten-
sions are coherent. Defining now P as P  j   minfP1 j ; P2 j g for
all events in C [P, P is coherent by Theorem 1 and it is easily seen that
it realizes conditions (4) in Definition 3.1. Therefore Pa and Pb are inde-
pendent partitions (under P ), but PA ^ B  0:14 > PAP B  0:08
(note that, on the set APa [APb, fP1; P2g is strictly included in the
independent envelope of P ).
4. Implications of epistemic independence
Suppose, throughout this section, that P is coherent on C [P, that the
partitions in S are (lg. i. and) independent with respect to P , and that whenever
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upper probabilities are defined they must also realize independence for the
partitions, so that (11) must hold for them.
A general question is to investigate the implications of these hypotheses on




U  fE1 _    _ En : Ei 2APi;P1 6    6 Pn;
i  1; . . . ; n; fP1; . . . ;Png  Sg:
Say that an extension of P to C [P [U is externally n-monotone if n-mo-
notonicity holds for each event in U, i.e. if 8E1 _    _ En 2 U






P Ei ^ Ej
     ÿ1n1
Proposition 2.
(a) If P strictly factors on P, so that equality always holds in (9), then P is
externally n-monotone;
(b) in any case, also when strict factorization does not apply, P is externally
2-monotone.
Proof. Apply (1) and (11) to write
P E1 _    _ En  1ÿ PEc1 ^    ^ EcnP 1ÿ P Ec1PEc2    PEcn
 1ÿ 1ÿ P E1    1ÿ P En:
Developing the last expression we obtain







     ÿ1n1PE1    PEn: 13
It is immediate from (12) and (13) to see that (a) holds. To prove (b), write (13)
for n 2 and apply (9). 
Comment 4.1. External n-monotonicity diers from standard n-monotonicity
just because it is applied to a set of events which is not the usual algebra of
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events logically dependent on a partition. It is external to each of the partitions
in S in the sense that the restriction of P on AP; 8P 2 S, may not be
n-monotone, and in general not even 2-monotone.
So (b) seems to suggest that (external) 2-monotonicity arises in strict con-
nection with independence, which following Definition 3.1 operates among and
not necessarily within partitions (property (b) is mentioned in [11, note 7 to
Section 9.1], in the case of independence for two events; see also Section 5.13.4
for a significant example where lack of independence is incompatible with
(standard) 2-monotonicity, but not with coherence).
As for (a), my feeling at present is that this property might concern a much
wider class of independent lower probabilities than those which strictly factor
on P: to be sure, it is not confined to them.
4.2. A result on independence propagation
Suppose, for instance, that S  fP1; . . . ;Pi; . . . ;Pj; . . .g, that i < j in the
partition indexes implies that the experiment whose outcomes are described by
(the atoms of) Pi takes place before that described by Pj, and that we believe
the partitions of S are epistemically independent (under a certain given P ). By
Definition 3.1, this implies in particular P E3 jE1 ^ E2  P E3, E3 2AP3,
Ei 2A/Pi; i  1; 2, which means that the evaluation on E3 is independent
from our knowing ‘what happened in the past’, if this is meant in the sense of
knowing jointly the truth values of any couple of events E1;E2,
Ei 2A/Pi; i  1; 2. Does this also imply independence from less punctual
information concerning the past, like knowing the truth value of, say, E1 _ E2?
More generally, given an arbitrary partition in S, let it be P1, consider a
finite number of partitions in S ÿ fP1g, for instance P2; . . . ;Pn. If Definition
3.1 holds, any event E1 2A/P1 is independent of our knowing jointly the
truth values of any nÿ 1 events E2; . . . ;En such that Ei 2A/Pi,
i  2; . . . ; n, i.e. is independent of any event belonging to the set A1 
A/P2 ^    ^A/Pn  fE2 ^    ^ En : Ei 2A/Pi; i  2; . . . ; ng. On the
other hand, if we know the truth values of the atoms of partitions P2; . . . ;Pn
we also know the truth values of the events in the set A A/P2 ^    ^Pn
of the non-impossible events logically dependent on the product partition
P2 ^    ^Pn. Clearly, A is a larger set than A1 (for instance, A1 is not
closed under complementation whilst A [ f/g is an algebra).
Now, the question is: does independence of E1 from any event in A1
propagate to independence of E1 from any event in A
?
When all partitions in S are finite, the following proposition assures in par-
ticular that independence from information arising fromA/P2 ^    ^A/Pn
implies independence from information depending on A/P2 ^    ^Pn.
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Proposition 3. Let S be an arbitrary set of lg. i. finite partitions and let P be a
lower probability on C which realizes independence for the partitions in S by
Definition 3.1; choose arbitrarily a partition P 2 S and then a product partition,
let us call it ^P, obtained as the product of a finite number of partitions in
S ÿ fPg. Then P has a unique coherent extension on every event E jF ,
E 2AP, F 2A/^P, given by
P E jF   P E: 14
Proof. It is not restrictive, but simplifies notation, to prove that (14) holds for
P  P1, ^P  P2 ^    ^Pn.
Call for this ei the generic atom of the product partition P2 ^    ^Pn.
From the finiteness hypothesis,P2 ^    ^Pn is made up of a finite number s of
atoms (by the logical independence assumption, s  s2 . . . sn, where si is the
number of atoms of Pi, i  2; . . . ; n). Hence any F 2A/P2 ^    ^Pn may
be written as a logical sum of a finite number of atoms of P2 ^    ^Pn.
We shall prove the thesis in three steps.
(a) Proving (14) involves operating with extensions of P . Now, by Theorem
1 every extension of P on an arbitrary C1  C may be obtained as the lower
envelope on C1 of a set M1 of precise probabilities such that the lower envelope
of the restriction of M1 on C, let us call it M, is the starting lower probability P .
Hence, possibly dierent coherent extensions of P on C1 could be obtained by
varying the probabilities in the set M.
Anyway, defining
MA jB  fP : P is a coherent precise probability on C;
P P P ; P A jB  P A jBg;
it is M 6 ; (by Theorem 1) and at least one probability P  2 M must be in-
cluded in every set M whose lower envelope on C is P , and this for every
A jB 2 C (again by Theorem 1).
(b) Let us now consider an arbitrary event E jF , E 2AP1, F 2
A/ P2 ^    ^Pn.
We shall prove in (b) that 8P  2 ME, (the extension of P  on C [ fE jF g is
such that) P E jF   P E. This implies P E jF 6 P E, since by (a) at least
one P  is included in any set M. Let us preliminarily note that
P E  RP E jeiP eiP PERP ei  P E; 15
where the summations are extended to all atoms ei of P2 ^    ^Pn and the
inequality holds since P E jeiP P E jei  P E (recall that E jei 2 C). But
P E  P E, so (15) implies
P E jei  P E; 8ei 2 P2 ^    ^Pn: 16
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From what seen just before (a), we can write F  _ei, the logical sum being
extended to the finite set of those atoms ei which imply F. Therefore we can
apply first the conglomerative property and then (16) to write (the summations
are of course extended to the atoms ei which imply F and only to them)
P E jF   P E ^ _ei j _ ei  RP E jeiP ei j _ ei
 P ERP ei j _ ei  P E: 17
(c) It is now easy to prove that every precise probability P dominating P on
C is such that P E jF   P E (follow the steps in (17), substituting P  with P
and replacing the third equality by P since P E jeiP P E jei  P E).
From this and the conclusions of (b) we obtain P E jF   PE: 
Comment 4.2. The result in Proposition 3 shows that there are instances where
independence is necessarily maintained when extending a lower probability. It
should be possible to generalise Proposition 3 in some directions, as long as the
hypothesis of finiteness of the partitions is maintained.
5. Conclusions
The approach followed in this note regards irrelevance as the essential
concept for interpreting and defining independence. Nevertheless we saw that
the property of strict factorization is always admissible and significant, not
only computationally.
We focused on the essential aspects, starting from consistency, of the notion
of independence proposed, which includes many concepts of independence
as special cases: for instance, independence among n events, putting S 
fP1; . . . ;Png, Pi  fAi;Aci g, i  1; . . . ; n.
Although we preferred to discuss independence for the more immediate case
of events, it is also possible to consider the atoms of each partition Pi in
Definition 3.1 as the distinct outcomes of a random number Xi, so that every
event Ei 2A/Pi identifies a subset vi of the set Vi of the admissible values for
Xi. Then epistemic independence for a family F of random numbers can be
defined by requiring that their underlying partitions are logically independent
and that the following equalities hold, 8X1;X2; . . . ;Xn 2F, 8vi 2 Vi ,
i  1; . . . ; n:
P X1 2 v1 jX2 2 v2 ^    ^ Xn 2 vn  P X1 2 v1:
A noteworthy feature is that, by the extension theorem (Section 2.4), it is al-
ways possible to assign lower probabilities only on subsets of AP, for some
or all P 2 S, and to extend them on a subset of C realizing partially the in-
dependence conditions (4): this will be the rule in many practical situations.
P. Vicig / Internat. J. Approx. Reason. 24 (2000) 235–250 249
Directions for further work include possible generalisations of independence
propagation, the treatment of conditional independence, and applications.
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